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“Pharmaceutical Reference Pricing Schemes and Their Policy 
Implications”. 
 
Abstract 
 
The increasing costs of health services stressed the need to control and contain expenditure. The 
Pharmaceutical sector has been chosen by many governments as a generous field for such 
containment. That way, the present thesis analyses one of the most popular regulatory policies in 
force, the reference pricing schemes.  
Through the thesis, we provide a review of published literature on the theme, underlining 
effects and consequences of the policy discussed in the economic literature. We then develop a 
theoretical model to derive the implications of the policy introduction. We conclude that the 
model built is able to capture main effects predicted by the economic literature. The policy 
introduction produces a sharp reduction of prices of all firms in the cluster and reduction in third 
payer expenditure. However, effects on consumer surplus are ambiguous. Final discussion on 
present thesis relates to the scheme engineering in order to power the effect of the policy. Using 
the model built we present strategies that policy maker might use to increase welfare. 
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“Esquemas de Preços de Referência Farmacêuticos e suas 
Implicações de Política”. 
 
Resumo. 
Os custos crescentes dos serviços de saúde salientaram a necessidade de controlar e conter a 
despesa em saúde. O sector farmacêutico foi escolhido por vários governos como um campo 
generoso para tal contenção. Dessa forma, a presente tese analisa uma das políticas de 
regulação mais populares em vigor, os esquemas de preços de referência.  
Ao longo da tese, realizamos uma revisão da literatura publicada sobre o tema, 
sublinhando efeitos e consequências da política discutidos na literatura económica. Em seguida, 
desenvolvemos um modelo teórico que nos permite derivar implicações da introdução da 
politica. Concluímos que o modelo construído é capaz de capturar os principais efeitos previstos 
pela literatura económica. A introdução da medida produz uma redução significativa dos preços 
de todas as empresas no grupo farmacêutico e uma redução das despesas do financiador. 
Contudo, os efeitos sobre o excedente do consumidor são ambíguos. A discussão final desta tese 
relaciona-se com a engenharia do esquema de forma a potenciar os seus efeitos. Usando o 
modelo, apresentamos estratégias que o decisor de política pode usar para aumentar o bem-
estar social.  
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1. Introduction 
 
During the last few decades we have been observing a clear development of the medical science. 
This development, however, has been costly for the most developed western countries, running 
increasing health expenses. Higher and increasing complexity in technologies, rising 
specialization of medical professionals, growing demand for health services and growing scale of 
the institutions contributed to the increase in health expenses. In countries with a clear state 
intervention this warning bells became amplified by the need to control the growth of public 
healthcare expenditure. With such pressure on decision makers, several policies have been tried 
during this time period. Although health care systems and services are some of the most 
complex institutions, with massive inefficiencies, one of the main focuses for this containment 
has been the pharmaceutical industry, often seen by the public opinion as a high profits sector.  
The increasing costs of health services left the majority of the world’s population without 
access to the most expensive health treatments. However, the social importance given to the 
value of life and the randomness of the disease epidemiology, created the consciousness that no 
one should be left without treatment, just because its price is not affordable at a given time. This 
market failure raised the need for insurance, whether it comes from a public or a private entity. 
The increase in insurance plans and systems left the demand for health quite insensitive to 
prices, which drove away competition in this market. It is in this conjuncture that RPS emerges 
as a policy able to, despite saving the access to health from most of the demand, transfer some 
of the expenditure to the consumer and breaking its insensibility to the price (Miraldo, 2009). 
Although competition is something desirable, within the pharmaceutical market under patent 
drugs are wittingly protected given the investments in R&D made to create the new drug. That is 
the reason why in the majority of the countries RPS is only implemented after the expiry of the 
branded drug patent1. 
During the last decade Portugal adopted a reference pricing system (RPS) that defined 
the most expensive generic as the reference (r) for the scheme. Although there have been some 
changes during the last few years, the scheme now defines the mean of the five cheapest 
generics, within the market, as reference. Looking at international experience we find even bigger 
heterogeneity in the design of the policies adopted. So much discrepancy invites us to, imbued in 
                                                          
1 R&D issues will be discussed in the R&D and market entry topic. 
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the spirit of the Alvin Roth “Economist as Engineer”, look for the best design for the market, or, 
at least, for indications on the policy implications. Of course our intentions with the present thesis 
are substantially more modest than to design a market structure as Alvin Roth has been doing 
during the last few decades. However, keeping in mind that this is an academic work we intend 
to draw some perspectives on the implications of the policy introduction, and how the 
manipulations of the variables of the policy enhances those implications. 
 The present thesis is structured as follows, in the first section we look at the literature on 
the theme presenting it in different perspectives. This way, we look at institutional background, 
trying to understand the design of the policy and how and when the policy was implemented in 
different countries. We then proceed to a description of the several versions of the policy, 
particularly on the differences between endogenous and exogenous reference pricing and 
therapeutic and generic reference pricing. The analysis focuses on the implications derived of 
each version and explored in the economic published literature. The implications of the policy on 
research and development and market entry are then addressed with some special focus on the 
determinants of generic entry, and the conditions for a sustainable research and development 
investments.  
 In the second section of the thesis we approach the question under study with a 
theoretical model. We apply a Hotelling model with two horizontally differentiated generic firms 
and a vertically differentiated brand firm. Such construction allows us to make a static analysis of 
the market deriving the policy effect on prices, demands, profits. Finally we look at welfare effects 
of a shift in the weight of the cheapest generic on the market in the reference scheme. In this last 
part of the thesis we analyze utility derived from consumption, firm profits, third-payer 
expenditures and social welfare. As we will discuss, the model allows us to derive some intriguing 
conclusions on the value of brand-generic differentiation and on the meaning of such 
differentiation. 
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2 Institutional Background and Literature Review 
 
2.1 Reference Pricing 
From either the demand or supply side policies tried in the sector, this thesis underlines the RPS. 
The regulatory policy strategy under focus relies substantially on generic market entry, after the 
term of the patent protection. This way, a functional RPS implies the creation of a cluster after 
the generic entry. The referred cluster is the set of drugs able to reproduce identical therapeutic 
effects, or with the same chemical composition. Depending on the methodology chosen to cluster 
drugs, it may be called therapeutic or generic RP. We will take a closer look on these two kinds of 
RP ahead. Once there is more than one drug within a cluster, the reference might be set 
depending on market variables. Despite the several possible formulations of a RP system it can 
be generalized as a function of consumer’s expenditure when buying a drug of price equal to P: 
                      
                                        
                          
   ,                               (1)   
where r is the reference price and         is the coinsurance rate and C is the consumer’s 
expenditure. In this simple scheme, it is clear that if a consumer buys a drug priced below the 
reference price r, then, faces a price equal to the amount of copayment set by the authorities 
times the price charged by the company. However, if the same consumer buys the expensive 
drug, above the reference price, pays the difference between prices, plus the copayment 
percentage times the price charged. Some systems may set the copayment to zero (  = 0), 
leaving no expense to the consumer in the case of choosing the drug priced below r. 
Generally reference pricing is not a pricing strategy, in fact, it is a reimbursement 
strategy where drug prices are affected in an indirect fashion (Miraldo, 2009, Dylst et al, 2012). 
Indeed, in several countries governments have tried other solutions that do not depend on the 
behavior of the agents in the market, like price reductions by decree (Danzon and Ketcham, 
2004), or price cap regulations (Brekke et al, 2011). Unlike a pure reimbursement system, 
where part of the price is supported by the insurer, regardless of the price charged, in a 
reference pricing the insurer supports a lump sum indexed to a reference previously set. As we 
will state ahead, the reference value can either be endogenously found in the market, or 
discretionally defined by the policy maker, and thus exogenously set. Therefore, despite of the 
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consumer’s choice, the third party preserves its expense, leaving the payment of the difference 
between the reference price and the price of the drug of his choice to the purchaser. 
As described, in this system, the different competitors in the market are not limited in 
their pricing (Ghislandi, 2009). The possibility of setting prices freely raises the questions of how 
should firms behave before the rules are set in the market. Nevertheless, the copayment 
exposure limits severely their options, as price sensitive consumers will be deviated to the 
competitors, thus forcing producers to reduce their prices (Mestre-Ferrandiz, 2003). This 
mechanism of increasing competition for the consumers’ demand drives us to the core of the 
RPS. Puig-Junoy (2010) in a literature review on the theme, using 16 papers for several european 
pharmaceutical markets, concluded that RPS managed to reduce generic prices. Nonetheless, 
such reduction is more evident in branded drugs than generics. Simultaneously, generic drugs 
under the reference tend not to reduce its price until reference price is reduced, even when there 
are cheaper drugs in the market. Neeraj et al. (2009) reached some different conclusions. Using 
data from 19 countries from 1992 to 2004, the authors try to isolate the influence of each 
regulatory policy in the pharmaceutical market revenues. Surprisingly, the authors conclude that 
RPS is the policy with less effect on revenues. Either direct price control or economic evaluation 
seem to have more impact on revenues, even so, the authors recognize that in the absence of 
price control the effect of RPS increases to 10,5% of revenues reduction. 
Although, according to most literature, the policy effects worldwide have been interesting, 
some note should be taken on other policy strategies that can muscle RPS and avoid 
opportunistic behaviors as those described above. Gonzalez et al. (2006) underlined the role of 
physicians in the introduction of new cheaper generics. The authors used the UK market of 
fluoxetine2 to conclude that after generic entry, and the decrease in marketing expenditure from 
the brand firm, prescriptions shifted to other molecules under patent protection. Such prescribing 
behavior not only decreased brand share, but the entire molecule market share, keeping 
expenditure. This shift shows how pharmaceutical firms are able to avoid price competition 
through advertising and other market strategies. The influence of persuasive advertising and 
marketing strategies on physicians is discussed by Konigbauer (2007) in a theoretical model of 
vertical differentiation with two periods. The author concludes that unlike economic literature 
suggests, persuasive advertising, in pharmaceutical markets, may not reduce welfare, as an entry 
deterrence strategy. Nevertheless Konigbauer (2007) does not assume the possibility raised by 
                                                          
2 Brand name Prozac. 
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Gonzalez et al. (2006) of shifting demand to other molecules. The behaviors described have all it 
takes to undermine policies that depend on the consumers’ sensibility to price, like RPS. In order 
to solve these problems, governments frequently try different strategies to control or suppress 
discretionary prescription from physicians. From restrictions to advertising, restriction on 
prescription by active ingredient (Kanavos et al., 2008 and Moreno-Torres et al., 2009), lists of 
available drugs to prescription, or dispenser permission to change prescription to the cheapest 
drug of the active ingredient (European Commission, 2009, Danzon et al. 2004), all has been 
tried to boost RPS’ efficiency.   
After its introduction, in Germany during the 90’s, the use of this strategy has spread 
throughout Europe and in some other countries like New Zealand or the USA. However countries 
like United Kingdom, Norway, Austria or Sweden prefer to use economic evaluation as a way of 
setting reimbursement level3. On the other hand, some divergences might be sighted between the 
different schemes used in the adopting countries. Not intending to anticipate the discussion of 
the effects of those different schemes, we will expose the several approaches to the policy. Some 
countries like Belgium, France, Croatia, Portugal or Spain adopted the ATC-54 level of the WHO 
drug classification to cluster drugs. Others, like the Netherlands or Hungary used 
pharmacological class. Still others, use ATC-4 level, like Germany. A combination of 
classifications might be found in other countries, where depending on each cluster might use 
pharmacological class or active ingredient to group drugs. 
Concerning the way the scheme defines the reference for reimbursement, numerous 
differences might be found in different countries. Croatia and Hungary define the reference as the 
mean of all prices. France uses the mean of all prices but only for generic drugs. A tighter 
scheme might be found in Finland, Italy or Spain where the reference is set equal to the lowest 
price of all drugs in the cluster. Someway close to the previous schemes is the one used by 
Denmark or Latvia that use the cheapest generic within the cluster. Portugal, in contrast, defines 
the reference as the mean of five cheapest generics inside the cluster since 2011. Even so, the 
most complex scheme might be found in Germany as a weighted mean of all drugs and 
calculated through regression analysis.  
                                                          
3 Although it is outside the scope of the thesis, there is literature sustaining such option, see Drummond et 
al. (1997) “The role of economic evaluation in the pricing and reimbursement of medicines” Health Policy 40,199-
205.   
4  According to ATC classification, level 1- Anatomical main group; level 2- therapeutic subgroup; level 3- 
Pharmacological subgroup; level 4- chemical subgroup; level 5- chemical substance.  
Levels are increasingly stricter concerning the spectrum of drugs included. 
13 
 
The dynamic of the policy implementation is also interesting, Norway and Sweden 
actually adopted RPS in 1993, before dropping the measure during the last decade. Several 
other countries shifted from generic to therapeutic referencing. Italy and Hungary followed that 
path to return later to generic clustering. Finally Germany started by adopting therapeutic 
reference pricing, to abandon the measure for new drugs in 1996, and reintroduced it again in 
2004 (Neeraj et al. 2009). 
Such wide and differentiated use of the policy shows not only its malleability, but also the 
different utility functions of the policy makers. This way, we will address the effects of each 
particular design on the outcomes achieved.  
 
2.2. Endogenous versus Exogenous RPS 
As described above, there are several versions of RPS identifiable from the policies implemented 
worldwide. The classification we approach now depends on the ability of the firms in the market 
to influence the reference. Therefore, we can classify as endogenous or exogenous RPS.  
The exogenous RPS is not a policy as popular as the endogenous version, and the reason 
might be on the lacking of incentives to trigger competition within the cluster. In fact, as 
described by Brekke et al (2011), in an exogenous system there is a clear incentive to converge 
to the reference price, after its reduction. Without the possibility of reducing the r, generic firms 
tend to increase the price as it is partly reimbursed. At the same time, with a cheaper competitor 
in the market, brand firms tend to decrease their price to avert the shifting of some demand to 
the generic. This way, we end up converging from above and from bellow r, and confirming the 
price convergence hypothesis.  
Another approach on an exogenous RPS was made by Mestre-Ferrandiz (2003). Using a 
theoretical static model with two duopolists, a branded and a generic one, horizontally 
differentiated, the researcher reaches some different conclusions from Brekke et al. (2011). The 
author argues that the effects of RPS might depend on the level of r. In fact, within a certain 
interval of r, set by authorities, the RPS is able to induce price reductions for both drugs when 
compared to the simple reimbursement scheme. Even though the introduction of RPS might 
increase brand demand, overall expenditure is reduced, due to the price reductions previously 
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described. In the same paper the author finds profit reduction for both firms in the market. The 
different results found by these two studies might reflect the different assumptions made by the 
authors, since Brekke et. al. compare RPS to a market without regulation, whereas Metre-
Ferrandiz et al. compare it to a pure reimbursement system. 
Although there are few exogenous RP schemes in force, it is possible to imagine an 
endogenous RP that, in theory, could be closer to an exogenous one. A sort of hybrid RPS could 
be the one where the reference is set as a mean of the prices in a large cluster, and where the 
update of RP is set rarely. In that case, despite the fact that the reference could be defined inside 
the market, the decision of one firm hardly could change the reference. At the same time, the 
higher length of the period between updates leads to an increase of the payoff for generic firms, 
as a result of deviating from low prices. Thus, the study of exogenous RPS raises some interest 
despite the fact that it has been progressively dropped during the last decade in favor of 
endogenous RPS. 
 
2.3 Endogenous RPS and Competition  
The RPS is generally presented with one objective in the view of policy makers, to contain 
pharmaceutical expenditure, whether it comes from reducing reimbursements, or from the shift 
in demand to generics (Mestre-Ferrandiz, 2003). Indeed, the incentives to increase generics 
market share aim to restrict the pharmaceutical expenditure, specially the third payer share 
(Dylst et al. 2012). However, from the literature explored to perform this thesis, the least that can 
be said is that the reach of this goal, through this policy, is dubious (Kanavos et al., 2009). The 
literature consulted is consensual in one point, any kind of effect derived from this policy depends 
on the ability of the scheme built, to create or increase competition, within the generics drugs 
market, in each cluster and promoting financial responsibility among consumers (Lopez-
Casasnovas and Jonsson, 2001; Ma, 1994; cit. by M. Miraldo, 2011). The focus put on 
competition is understandable in an endogenous system where the level of reimbursement is set 
as a function of the generic prices in the previous period: 
                                                      ,                                              (2) 
where   (with      ) defines the influence of each firm in r, in the following period. 
Despite being extracted from a model set for only two firms, it illustrates quite clearly that the 
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generic lower price exposes the branded price to a copayment. This effect is increased by what 
Ghislandi (2011) calls brand independence (BI) where   is set to 1 and the branded price has no 
influence in the construction of the reference price. This way, we assume that the generic firm is 
allowed to set the level of reimbursement freely. In its paper, dedicated to the influence of RPS 
on competition, BI holds a central role in its analysis. The author concludes that under BI, prices 
are always lower, than when BI does not hold (Ghislandi, 2011). In fact, the same author also 
recognizes that generic firms are “under the pressure of two opposite forces. One the one hand, 
the firms have an incentive to obtain a higher r, on the other hand, they do not want the branded 
to be close to the reimbursement level” (Ghislandi, 2011). Thus, it would be strategically 
profitable for generics to collude around r leaving it unchanged above their marginal cost. If that 
was the result of a RPS implementation, then, one might predict that r would be higher than 
optimal, prices paid by consumer would be lower for a sufficiently high reimbursement and 
consumption would be higher as well.  
Merino-Castello (2003) approaches the theme comparing a market where consumers 
pay a fixed amount of drug price to a RPS. Using a vertical differentiated model with two firms, 
the author analyzes the RPS effects under Bertrand competition and under Stackelberg dynamic. 
Inspired by the introduction of the system in the Spanish pharmaceutical market, the researcher 
finds that after the insertion of the RPS all prices reduced. However, the effect is clearer on brand 
prices, although, under Stackelberg assumption, the brand market share increases. In fact, with 
the exception of Stackelberg results, the findings are in line with the literature. Nevertheless, the 
advantage of the brand, with the possibility of defining quantities might be an unrealistic one, 
since the pharmaceutical market seems more likely to compete in prices rather than in 
quantities.   
The idea of the increase in competition after the introduction of RPS is also supported by 
Pavcnik (2002). Using data from Germany from 1986 to 1996, the author concludes that 
endogenous reference pricing actually increased price competition and forced brand drugs to 
reduce their price by 21% to 26% on average. Although reduction of prices for generics is less 
noticeable, it is increasing on the number of generics within the cluster. Another interesting point 
concluded by the author, which links us to the next point on this thesis, is that reimbursement 
reductions increase competition within the active ingredient group and not between therapeutic 
substitutes. Such result is particularly interesting since the German RPS clustering method is 
known to generate large clusters with several active ingredients within them. 
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Returning to Brekke et al. (2011), the empirical part of the work also suggests a clear 
effect of RPS. Using data for Norway from 2001 to 2004 for the 40 largest clusters, the authors 
conclude that there is a clear effect on prices. Thereby, Brekke et al. (2011) find a price 
reduction close to 30% of all drugs together with a substantial reduction in the brand market 
share. Looking at the scheme effects on the different kind of drugs, the data suggests that the 
effects on brand prices are stronger with 33% price reduction, than on generics with 22%. 
Concerning competition, the authors conclude that the number of generic competitors has a 
negative effect on the brand market share. On the contrary, the number of therapeutic 
competitors tends to increase the brand market share, what the authors justify with a previous 
price reduction in response to therapeutic competition that could improve that indicator. 
It is now clear that the effects of this policy specially on public expenditure, but also for 
patients spending, can be strongly enhanced by triggering competition reducing generic prices to 
marginal cost, or at least closer to it. That kind of consequence provided by competition would 
decrease r turning brand drug more costly to patient shifting demand to generics and 
consequently forcing a reduction in the brand price, as proven by Brekke et al. (2011). 
 
2.4. Therapeutic versus Generic RP  
Obviously, the RPS is not applicable indiscriminately, usually each reference is attached to a 
cluster of drugs chosen for their therapeutic use or their active ingredient. Each cluster will have 
an own reference, set as each legislation determines, the lowest price inside the cluster, a mean 
of the cheapest prices as Portuguese present case, or the most expensive of the generic prices 
inside the cluster as it was in Portugal until 2010.  
Brekke et al. (2007) describe three mechanisms of clustering the drugs; products with 
the same active chemical ingredients, products that may be neither chemically identical nor 
pharmacologically equivalent, but have comparable therapeutic effects. And finally, products with 
chemically related active ingredients that are pharmacologically equivalent. In this classification 
the authors define the first case as generic reference pricing. Implicitly, we are assuming that to 
have several producers of the same active chemical ingredient its patent must have expired. The 
second and third cases are defined as therapeutic reference pricing, in which, the cluster of 
drugs may include brand name under patent drugs. According to WHO’s classification of drugs, 
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we could define a generic RP as the ATC-5 clustering method and therapeutic RP as ATC-4 
clustering method. Such classification is often used in literature to describe both reference 
systems. 
In fact, TRP schemes might include in the same cluster, and at the same time, under 
patent drugs, off patent drugs and generic drugs. Although this distinction refers to very little 
details that might seem innocuous at the first sight, the difference between them has been 
raising some controversy inside the pharmaceutical industry and scientific community. The main 
argument for the controversy is whether patent drugs should be subjected to competition during 
its patent protection period or not and the effects that competition might have on the stimulus for 
R&D from pharmaceutical companies.  
The policy makers’ option for one version of RP is not indifferent to the objectives 
intended for the pharmaceutical market. There is a broad spectrum of decisions when we 
analyze international RPS. New Zealand, the Netherlands and Germany opted for the therapeutic 
version of the policy (Danzon et al, 2004). Other countries like USA, Spain and Portugal, 
however, have chosen the generic version (Danzon et al, 2004, Moreno-Torres et al. 2009).  
The different options in those countries raise the question of what drove decision makers 
to opt for one version instead of the other. Brekke et al. (2007) used a theoretical approach on 
the theme. The model developed assumes three firms, one of them still under patent protection, 
and two others, one generic, and one of the branded without patent protection. The authors also 
assume that the branded drugs are horizontally differentiated, while there are high quality 
consumers and low quality consumers (brand and generic consumers respectively). The authors 
conclude that generic RP should never be considered as this version tends to increase the total 
mismatch costs of drugs5. This version of RP is also known to create what is described as 
“generic paradox”. This phenomenon happens when after the entry of a new generic in the 
market, it is possible to observe an increase in the price charged by the branded drug. The 
propensity for the generic paradox is related to generic RP as it creates a gap between the prices, 
paid by the patient, for the two drugs, since the under patent drug is not reimbursed at all. This 
fact implies that the branded drug only keeps the more insensitive consumers, which triggers an 
incentive to increase price. Implicitly, we are talking of a cross effect since the patent drug is not 
on the system and can only be affected by some kind of substitutability with the generic versions 
                                                          
5
 In this approach, consumers face a cost of deviating from their natural choice, that is the 
closest firm in the demand space. See Brekke et al. (2007) 
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available in the market. Either way, more important to the theme discussed here is the fact that 
“the competitive effect of TRP is larger in markets where there is less competition to begin with. 
This suggests that, if the regulator is mainly concerned about reducing drug spending, the 
therapeutic clusters should be broadly defined” (Brekke et al., 2007). 
The previous idea of increased competition in broader clusters goes in line with the 
conclusions derived by Danzon and Ketcham (2004). The authors explore the applicability of TRP 
in Medicare through the experience of countries such as Germany, Netherlands and New 
Zealand. From the comparison of the different systems, the authors conclude that the broader 
clusters of the German system allowed the country to benefit from lower prices and consequently 
lower reimbursements from the public system. However, that benefit achieved had a large cost 
given by reduction in new drugs entry to the market.  
Even though the price reduction caused by the introduction of RPS might be more 
aggressive in the therapeutic version, GRP also induces brand price reductions. That idea is 
supported by Bergman et al. (2003) in a study on the potential competition in pharmaceutical 
markets. Using data from eighteen pharmaceutical substance markets in Sweden, the authors 
conclude that the introduction of GPS decreased brand prices facing generic competition by 14 to 
15%. Nonetheless, later generic entrants seem not to have the same price decreasing effect they 
had before the introduction of the policy. This seems to indicate that price reductions caused by 
RPS happen right after patent protection expiration and with the first generics entries to the 
clusters. Using data for the same country from 1972 to 1996, but with only twelve molecule 
markets, Aronsson et al. (2001) reach some similar conclusions. The introduction of reference 
pricing managed to increase generic market shares in five markets and reduced pharmaceutical 
prices specially of branded drugs. Simultaneously, the number of generics within the cluster 
increased the relative difference between brand and generic prices. Those results are in line, not 
only with Bergman et al. (2003), but also with Puig-Junoy (2010) and seem to gather some 
consensus on the particular effect of GRP on brand prices and its dependency on generic 
competition to reach a higher effect.  
Concluding the analysis on the dichotomy therapeutic versus generic RP, broader 
clusters increase competition, reducing pharmaceutical costs (Brekke et al., 2007). In this case, 
TRP produces more containment by including brand and patent protected drugs in the system. 
However, the expenditure reduction and a broader cluster also reduce the incentives to new 
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entry. Concerning market entry and investments in R&D, literature addresses effects in an isolate 
fashion, which is somehow an unrealistic approach as effects from the cluster structure of RP 
(whether generic or therapeutic) and the source of reference (endogenous or exogenous) often 
intersect as most countries policies are hybrid. 
 
2.5. R&D and market entry. 
New market entries, of innovative drugs, are an issue of concern for health policy decision 
makers. In fact, innovations in health procedures often come from three different areas, new 
diagnostic techniques or procedures, new chirurgical techniques and new pharmacological 
treatments. While diagnostic and chirurgical techniques are easily and quickly adopted by 
surgeons, pharmacological innovations depend on market conditions to enter a specific country. 
Admitting that a specific health system will be deprived of a new treatment for several years, 
because of the market regulation of the country has health, social and political costs. We are 
facing here a tradeoff between today’s costs and fewer new treatments in the future for growing 
populations (Neeraj et al. 2009). Thus, the discussion of what influences market entry and R&D 
investments is of some interest. 
The R&D issues are addressed by Bardley et al. (2009) using a theoretical approach. The 
authors use a dynamic model with three agents - pharmaceutical firms, consumers, and a 
regulatory entity. In the end, the instigators test the influence of model variables with an empirical 
work on the French market of statins. The study concludes that the reference pricing scheme 
tends to delay new innovations since the threat of generic competition, after losing patent 
protection, reduces future revenues. Still, generics on their hand have to consider the effects of 
price competition when entering the market. Under authors considerations, this threat might 
delay competition and by so, increase incentives to launch pioneers (Bardley et al., 2009). 
Another interesting point on this issue is the increased incentives that therapeutic RP creates to 
new breakthrough innovations. As the so called me-too drugs tend to be introduced in existing 
clusters, under price competition, pharmaceutical firms try to avoid that competition by creating 
new treatments (Bardley et al., 2009).  
The distortions raised by price regulations do not affect only R&D investments. The 
market entry of innovative drugs might be delayed in countries that limit firms natural pricing 
strategies. Kyle (2003) explores the idea with an empirical paper using data for all drugs 
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developed between 1980 and 2000 and respective date of market entry crossed with OECD 
health data set. The author reaches some interesting conclusions concerning market entry and 
diffusion of drugs through markets. Countries with strict regulatory policies tend to see delays in 
the entry of new drugs in their markets. Consequently, these countries tend to be the last 
receiving innovative drugs. The launch of a drug in countries like France, Italy or Spain reduces 
the probability of introducing the same drug in other markets. Furthermore, if those remaining 
countries also have price controls, the probability of entry reduces by another 15-25%. At the 
same time, drugs developed by American, British and Swiss firms reach more countries than 
French, Italian or Japanese firms, which might be related with the regulatory policy used by the 
firm’s country of origin. Curiously, firms from countries without price regulation tend to avoid 
countries that use such policies, which might function as a protectionist strategy (Kyle, 2003). 
Although without the serious concerns related with health and innovative treatments 
exposed above, generic entry has gained importance in economic literature. Generic entry has 
deep influence in the RP scheme outcomes. Gishlandi et al. (2005) conclude that Italian RPS 
could derive higher welfare if there were a higher number of generic competitors within the 
clusters. Thus, it is no surprise that policy makers often face a narrow window of decision. On 
one hand, they are interested in generic competition and in squeezing pharmaceutical market 
margins; on the other hand they are interested in generic entry and higher incentives to its 
consumption. Moreno-Torres et al. (2009) explore generic entry determinants using Spanish data 
on 77 active ingredient markets from 1999-2005. The authors conclude that revenues, market 
age, and more surprisingly, brand competitors have positive effect on generic market entry. The 
answer to the apparent paradox of increased generic entry in markets with more brand 
competitors might lie on molecule market size. Bergman et al. (2003) argues that larger market 
size increases generic entry and brand firms might be also attracted by the same reasons 
generic firms are. Thus, market size may induce higher revenues which invite both brand and 
generic competitors. On the other side, the number of generic incumbents and regulation reduce 
generic entry (Moreno-Torres et al., 2009). The authors conclude that the introduction of RP in 
Spain in 2000 reduced the number of new generic entries by 48% and the new version of the 
system introduced in 2004 reduced the amount of new entries by another 72%6 (Moreno-Torres 
                                                          
6 The authors use a negative binomial regression, and due to the large number of zeros created by the 
markets where there was no generic entry in several quarters, also use a zero-inflated negative binomial regression. 
All independent variables are statistically significative. Generic imbumbents in the market reduce expected number of 
entries by 5,65%, for each additional brand competitor the average number of entries increase 9,97%. For each 
21 
 
et al., 2009). The European Commission (2009) reached the same conclusion, for tightly 
regulated markets, generic entry tends to diminish and to delay in time. However, some 
regulatory policies, like compulsory generic substitution by pharmacists, tend to increase generic 
entry.  
The incentive to price reduction might be specially dangerous when it comes to R&D. 
Reduction in R&D investment might be the optimal strategy for a firm if new investments do not 
deviate it from competition. In that case, the new drug would be included in a cluster exposing 
the investment to a low return. As a consequence of the hard competition, fewer innovative drugs 
would enter the market, exposing consumers to the cost of not having the ideal drug for the 
treatment they need. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
million euros increase in revenues, the average generic entries increase 3.6%. And finally, for each quarter since the 
first entry the expected number of entries reduces in 20,10% (Moreno-Torres et al. 2009).  
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3. The Model  
 
To approach this theme in an analytical fashion, we model a market of an off-patent prescription 
drug. That way, issues concerning R&D developed in the literature review are disregarded. From 
the demand side, we have n consumers uniformly distributed on a line of length one. For 
simplicity we normalize n to 1. Each consumer demands one unit of the prescribed drug.  
From the supply side we have three firms within the cluster, one branded (B) and two 
generic firms that we will call generic 1 (G1) and generic 2 (G2). In order to describe the market 
we use a derivation of the Hotelling model where the three firms are located in the line7. Generic 
1 drug is located at point zero, and generic drug 2 is located at  <1, so that it captures a bigger 
share of the demand for the prescription drug, all else equal8. The location of the generic 2 drug 
is intended to imply the price difference among the generic drugs required to analyze the policy 
implications of a shift in the price weights of the reference system. The branded drug, however, 
does not have a “physical” location within the line. That way, consumers along the line 
homogeneously perceive the branded drug quality, or characteristics, to be the same9. 
The utility of the consumer located at x and consuming one unit of the drug from one 
firm (j) might then be defined as: 
             
                                                                                    
                                                                            
                                                                      
  ;                       (3) 
Where x is the location of the consumer in the line, U is the utility derived from the consumption 
of the drug. So, CB, CG1 and CG2, are respective copayments. Finally, the parameter t is the 
marginal cost of travelling along the line. Although this parameter is not crucial for the analysis, it 
deserves some considerations. It captures the level of vertical differentiation and therefore, the 
advantage of the branded firm since its consumers do not face those costs. Thus, one can 
intuitively predict that a higher t increases brand market share and for that reason its price, but 
most of all, reduces the competition effects triggered by the reference pricing scheme. Yet, t also 
                                                          
7 Unlike Harold Hotelling (1929) firm location refers to the tastes of consumers and not to physical 
locations. 
8 Further ahead in the thesis, we will impose a restriction on l values in order to guarantee a stable Nash 
equilibrium. 
9 Equivalent to assuming that the branded drug is located at each point on the line. 
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captures the level of horizontal differentiation between generics, like in the classical Hotelling 
model10. Consequently, t captures both differentiation effects. 
In a market with insurance intervention, the consumer gets to pay only a part of the real 
price of the drug. Like it is expressed in the utility function (4), the share supported by the 
consumer may be called the copayment and is the only portion of the price relevant for the 
consumer decision. Assuming that PG1 < PG2 < PB copayment might also be endogenously defined 
as: 
                                                   ,                                                      (4) 
                                                 ,                                                                (5) 
                                                     ,                                                   (6) 
where          is the coinsurance rate; PB, PG1 and PG2 are respectively the brand, generic 1 and 
generic 2 firm prices, and r is the reference price. From the function exposed above, it is 
straightforward to realize that a market with no regulation could be a particular case of the model 
described if we set    . That way, the consumer would pay the price of the drug without any 
reimbursement.  
Concerning the reference price (r) we use an approach similar to the one used by Brekke 
et al. (2011), with the reference set as a function of market prices, however, in this function, both 
prices are from generic drugs. That way, the model is able to endogenize r: 
                                                                      ,                                                       (7) 
where         is the weight of generic 1 price in the reference used for reimbursement. 
Since we have defined utility function and all the endogenous variables of the model, we 
can now derive the indifferent consumers between either the generic 1 drug and the brand, and 
the brand and generic 2 drug. To derive the indifferent consumer locations we have to equalize 
utility functions of brand consumers and generic firm 1 consumers: 
                                                      ,                                                        (8) 
  Solving for x and replacing CB and CG1 for the respective functions (4) and (5) we get the 
expression for the location of the indifferent consumer (z1): 
                                                          
10 In the classical Hotteling model transportation costs have a literal interpretation. However, the higher t 
increases the cost of traveling the same distance. See Harold Hotelling, “Stability in Competition”(1929) 
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 .                                               (9) 
Using the same methodology, but this time for the upper indifferent consumer, we have 
the equality of the utility derived from the consumption of the branded drug and generic 2 drug is 
given by: 
                                           –            .                                                 (10)         
Once again, solving for x and replacing CB and CG2 for (4) and (6) respectively: 
                                           
      
 
 ,                                                  (11) 
where z2 is the indifferent consumer between the brand and the generic 2.  
 With the expressions of indifferent consumers setting the bounds of each firm market, we 
might define demand functions for each firm as: 
                                                                            ,                       (12) 
where yB, yG1, yG2 are respectively brand, generic 1 and generic 2 firm demands. Replacing (11) 
and (9) in (12) we explicitly define demands as: 
                                   
                    
 
 ,                                         (13) 
                                   
              
 
                                                        (14) 
                                                      
      
 
 .                                                     (15) 
To illustrate the market described above, consider the following figure: 
 
 
 
  In order to simplify the model no variable or fixed costs of production are assumed. 
Although it is not the case of innovative drugs, the previous assumption is not that far from 
reality, since new generic competitors and brand incumbents face very reduced costs of 
production in most molecules. So, profit functions become price times demand as follows: 
                                                                                                    (16) 
  
Figure 1 
   1 0 
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where            are respectively brand, generic 1 and generic 2 firm profits. The subsequent 
game assumes the following rules - first the policy maker defines the drug price share supported 
by the consumer and the weight of each generic in the reference. Then, the three firms play a 
simultaneous pricing game.  
 
3.1 Nash equilibrium 
 
Using profit functions defined at (16) and replacing demands for (13), (14) and (15), 
respectively, we end up with profit expressions as functions of prices and the reference. Taking 
first order conditions in order to optimize profits, and solving for each price we get best response 
functions;  
                                                    
                  
 
                                        (17) 
                                                       
             
  
                                               (18) 
                                                      
           
 
                                                      (19)  
where μ is a parameter, increasing in either α or β as follows: 
                                                                  .                                           (20) 
At this point, we are able to develop the first interpretations from the model. As it is 
possible to understand from best response functions, prices are strategic complements. The 
exception here is the relation between     and     that is of strategic substitutes, although     
does not depend on    .  
The interesting point here is not only the fact that generic prices are the exception by 
being strategic substitutes, but also that they do not have the same impact on each other. 
Looking at them separately, the effect of a price increase of PG2 decreases PG1. The clue to the 
explanation of this outcome might be implicit in the reference pricing. The reader could note that 
the strength of this substitution effect depends on  . In fact, an increase in PG2 increases r, if   is 
not set equal to one (    11. The increase of r reduces copayment from branded drug (CB), all 
                                                          
11 Means that PG2 has some influence in r. If     or     then     and from the equation (12) the 
effect of PG2 on PG1 is null. 
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else equal. In its turn, the reduction of the copayment increases brand demand since the 
branded drug becomes relatively cheaper. Finally, the brand demand increase shifts the location 
of the indifferent consumer (z1) to the left, reducing generic firm 1 demand and obliging the firm 
to answer reducing prices. 
The opposite, though, is not true. An increase in PG1 has no effect on PG2. Once again the 
reason is r. An increase in firm 1 price raises r, hence, reducing copayment for the branded 
drug. Unlike the previous description, this time, the shift in r also affects the generic drug in the 
same amount it affects the branded drug’s price. This way, the relative prices for consumers 
remain the same, leaving the location of the indifferent consumer unchanged. Therefore, the 
demand for the second generic, as well as its price does not change, all else equal. Indeed, the 
expression “all else equal” gains substantial emphasis in this case. Although PG2 has a negative 
direct effect on PG1, and PG1 has no direct effect on PG2, they do have indirect contradictory effects 
through PB. The positive effect of an increase of PG2 on PB is more than proportional for any   
   , and that strategic complement effect is transferred through the brand price to PG1. The 
same happens with the effect of PG1 on PB, and once again, through it, on PG2. With this 
information, economic intuition tells us that a decrease in one price should led to general 
decrease of all prices, even with the exceptions described above.  
Simultaneously solving first order conditions in order to find equilibrium prices we get:  
                    
             
    
            
            
        
           
    
    
 .             (21) 
Thus, firms demands become: 
                    
             
    
            
            
    
            
    
    
                       (22) 
and respective explicit profit functions: 
                    
          
    
 
 
           
               
          
              
    
    
 
 
       (23) 
In order to produce a Nash equilibrium that respects the conceptual model described 
above, we introduce some conditions that restrict the set of values that one or more variables 
might assume. Above all, we need to guarantee that generic firm 1 is always the less expensive 
drug in the market. Such condition enables the reference system to fluctuate between generic 
prices.  
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Assumption 1: In equilibrium generic firm 1 drug is always the cheapest drug available 
for consumers. 
This assumption grants that there is a price gap between the two generic firms with the 
purpose of allowing the reference scheme to shift the weight between them both. So analytically 
we have         and then: 
                                   
            
        
    
    
    
 .                                             (24) 
The previous inequality (24) is satisfied for any    
       
      
  and in that case, it is clear 
that for    , which is true for     or    , any   in the market produces a          . 
The exception here is the extreme point    , where the game between the two firms becomes 
symmetric and then        . For    , value that may be achieved for     or    , 
the set of locations that fulfills this condition is reduced to     
 
 
. 
 
Assumption 2: In equilibrium all demands are positive. 
This grants that all firms produce in equilibrium. So, for firm 1 we have; 
                                       
            
    
  ,                                                   (25) 
that is satisfied for   
    
    
. 
For firm 2 the previous assumption assumes the form of the condition: 
                                          
    
    
   ,                                                    (26) 
which is satisfied for any      
   
 
 , and then for all        . 
The brand demand must also be positive which means, 
                                     
           
    
   ,                                              (27) 
and may be satisfied if    
   
   
, and once more for all         meaning that concerning the 
demand, the branded firm and the generic firm 2 have positive demands in equilibrium for any  . 
Concluding, the second assumption of the model only implies the restriction for the positivity of 
firm 1’s demand, and therefore,   
    
    
 in equilibrium. 
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Assumption 3: The location of the indifferent consumer between the branded drug and 
the generic 2 drug is to the left of12   in equilibrium (     . 
                                 
      
    
  
             
      
  ,                             (28) 
is satisfied if   
   
   
. Reminding the conclusions of assumption 1 and 2, this restriction 
diminishes the set of locations available for a stable equilibrium, binding assumption 2 and the 
same for the assumption that       . 
  
Assumption 4: All consumers located in the interval        prefer G2 over B. 
The assumption is satisfied if the following condition is true; 
                                                  ,                                                         (29) 
                                               
     
     
                                                             (30) 
Since, 
                            
     
     
 
   
   
    
    
           
                                        (31) 
the assumption 4 binds previous assumptions 2 and 3 and decreases substantially the set of 
locations available for a stable equilibrium.  
The equilibrium requires that all conditions are fulfilled, and so, from assumption 1 and 
4; 
                                   
     
     
   
       
      
.                                                       (32) 
The parameter space defined by (32) is non-empty if: 
                   
       
      
 
     
     
   
          
          
      
 
 
.                             (33) 
We can now conclude that there is a set of locations and   values that satisfy all the 
conditions and may generate a stable equilibrium. For α =1 or β =1 then     resulting in 
                                                          
12 Graphically is to the left of l as can be seen in figure 1. 
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    . We then end with an upper and a lower bound of locations where a stable 
equilibrium is possible and that come from a function of   and  : 
                                                                                                           (34) 
 
3.2. Comparative statics 
Now that we know the locations available for equilibrium, we can use the expressions 
exposed to describe the model, in order to derive conclusions about profits, prices, market 
shares, consumer utility and third payer share. Beginning with prices and taking the derivatives of 
the expressions for equilibrium prices, with the purpose of studying the effect of a change in the 
coinsurance rate (   and in the weight of the different generics on reference scheme (  , on 
firm prices, we get; 
For the branded firm; 
                                       
   
  
            
    
        
                                          (35) 
                                        
   
  
            
    
       
                                            (36) 
For generic firm 1; 
                            
    
  
         
                            
             
                         (37) 
                          
    
  
         
                             
             
                          (38) 
 For generic firm 2: 
                                          
    
  
           
    
       
                                          (39) 
                                          
    
  
           
    
       
   .                                      (40) 
All the partial derivatives are negative for any location within the set able to produce 
equilibrium, as described above. This finding goes in line with the literature analyzed in previous 
chapters, and tells us that an increasing coinsurance rate, as well as an increasing weight of the 
cheapest generic on the reference implies a general price reduction. Although the effect and part 
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of the mechanism might be the same, the reasoning for such effect is different for the two 
parameters.  
The outcome of a coinsurance increase might be explained by the increased exposure of 
consumers to prices. This way, consumers become more sensitive to the price differences 
between drugs, once without any price change branded drug becomes relatively more expensive. 
The previous description configures a price elasticity increase caused by the reduction of the 
share covered by the third payer. If that is true, then firm 1 has higher incentives to trigger a 
price war, since for the same price reduction the demand share captured is bigger. This precise 
effect will be checked when analyzing demand effects of a variation of  . 
When it comes to the effect of a fluctuation in the influence of the cheapest generic     
on prices, the results also indicate a general decrease of prices. With the increased influence of 
its price, firm 1 has incentives to reduce it, exposing the other firms’ consumers to a growing 
copayment of their drugs. Once again, reference pricing raises the incentives to trigger price 
competition through the increase in price elasticity of demand. Following this price strategy from 
firm 1, the other firms on the market are obliged to react trying to save their demands, and in 
such a market, that can only be achieved through a price reduction. The difference between 
parameters here (  and  ) is in the onus of triggering the price demand elasticity increase. The 
change in   produces a direct effect of the policy maker decision, however, the change in   
allows generic firm 1 to have that influence. 
 
Proposition 1: An increase in the coinsurance rate or in the relative weight of the 
cheapest generic on r, leads to a general price decrease. 
 
To complete the comparative statics analysis of prices is crucial to analyze the effects on 
firm demands for the same parameters. Regarding the demand we get the following results. 
For the Branded firm; 
   
   
  
           
    
       
           
   
  
           
    
       
       (41) 
For Firm 1; 
    
    
  
         
    
       
       
    
  
          
    
       
   .            (42) 
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For firm 2; 
   
    
  
          
    
       
          
    
  
          
    
       
   .     (43) 
Following the price effects explanation, the demand’s first order derivatives in order to   
and  , expressed above, not only support, but also complement the analysis of the market. 
Looking at the expressions, it is clear that an increase in either parameter under study increases 
firm 1’s demand, diminishing firm 2’s and Brand’s demand. This information suggests, once 
again, that the price reduction of the two latter firms happens precisely in response to this 
demand reductions. At the same time, the demand increase for firm one’s drug is due to the 
price reduction fostered by the change in parameters. Concluding, when looking at demand 
effects we are looking at derivate effects of the price changes. These results are in line with 
Aronsson et al. (2001), explained in the literature review, since the introduction of RPS increased 
generic market shares. 
 
Proposition 2: An increase in the coinsurance rate or in the relative weight of the 
cheapest generic on r raises the cheapest generic market share and reduces the brand and 
expensive generic share. The generic market share, as a whole, increases. 
 
Now shifting the focus to firm profits, for the brand firm; 
                              
   
  
           
    
       
                                    (44) 
                              
   
  
          
    
       
                                     (45) 
For firm 2, 
                 
    
  
          
       
       
          
    
  
          
       
       
         (46) 
In order to simplify the analysis of profits, and due to the complexity of the expression for 
firm 1’s profits, the expression is evaluated at     and    . This adaptation in the 
approach implies a slightly restrictive analysis. In fact, unlike all previous interpretations the 
results obtained are obviously valid at points     and      only. So, for firm 1; 
          
    
  
 
   
         
          
   
           
    
  
 
   
           
          
   
  (47) 
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For generic firm 2, and for the brand firm, the effects on profits are quite clear, they 
decrease for an increase of both parameters. This effect is obvious since we had seen that both 
demand and prices were decreasing in   and  . Those two combined effects could only result in 
a profit decrease. Concerning firm 1, the outcome is a bit more complex. From expressions 
above, we can understand that all depends on the second degree polynomial in the numerator. 
The root acceptable within the model is   
  
  
 meaning that firm one’s profit depends on the 
level of horizontal differentiation assumed. If the firm 2’s location assumed in the market is 
bigger than the previous value, say   
  
  
, then generic 1 firm profits decrease. However, if the 
level of horizontal differentiation is lower, say   
  
  
, firm one’s profits will increase.  
The basis behind such outcome is related to the balance between demand increase and 
price decrease. The closer firm 2 is to the middle of the market, the lower brand price might be. 
This effect implies a smaller dispersion of prices between the three firms, which means that for 
the same price reduction from firm 1’s side, yields a smaller demand increase. This reduction in 
price elasticity of demand, forced by the lower value of  , decreases the profitability of the price 
reduction, and for a location sufficiently close to the center of the market, the effect of a increase 
of   or   becomes negative for generic firm 1. 
 
Proposition 3: An increase in the coinsurance rate or in the relative weight of the 
cheapest generic on r, reduces the profits of the brand and the expensive generic firm. The effect 
on the cheapest generic firm profits depends on the degree of horizontal differentiation. 
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4. Welfare analysis 
 
The welfare analysis is probably the most important part of this entire thesis. Taking a 
philosophical perspective on the subject, welfare is a measure of the value generated by market 
transactions between agents. Such concept means that we are interested in understanding the 
implications of policy shifts, on overall value created, and also on the value that each agent 
extracts from the market.  
We are now able to reach the core of the project and interpret the political implications of 
the pharmaceutical reference pricing scheme. In order to achieve this objective, we will take a 
closer look at the three components of total welfare, these being total utility, total profits and third 
payer’s share, in this precise order. To finish, we will evaluate the effects on the aggregate entity, 
total welfare and total welfare minus profits. Unlike the methodology used up to this point, I will 
drop the study of rate of coinsurance    , to focus completely on the effect that a change in the 
influence of the cheapest generic on the reference scheme     has on each component of 
welfare.  
 
4.1. Total Utility 
Starting with total utility, this entity has four components, the utility of the firm 1’s 
consumers, from brand’s consumers and finally from firm 2’s consumers. The generic 2 
consumers might be divided in two groups, completing the four sections referred, the utility of 
consumers below   of firm 2 and those above firm 2’s location. Reminding the utility function of 
firm 2’s consumers, the module captures precisely the two shares of the second generic drug’s 
demand. Therefore total utility (Q) becomes;  
               
  
 
                  
 
  
  
                          
 
 
                              .                              (48) 
Taking first order derivative and evaluating at point     we obtain; 
                               
  
  
 
   
    
                                 
   
   .                          (49) 
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 The previous expression tells us that the effect of a slight reduction in  , when the 
reference scheme sets all the weight on the cheapest generic, is ambiguous. For a sufficiently 
high value of coinsurance, say   near 1, the effect of a reduction in  , when the parameter is set 
equal to 1 reduces total utility. Remember that for     this derivative holds no significance, 
since for that value of coinsurance we end in a market with no reimbursement and thus with no 
influence for r. From an analytical perspective, for a lower  , the location required to turn the 
expression (49) to negative terms is higher. When   
  
  
 the expression assumes negative 
values for any   inside market bounds, meaning that a reduction of   would increase consumer 
utility. The economic justification for such result might be explained through the brand price. A 
decrease in   implies an increase in r since the expensive generic gains weight in the r function. 
As a consequence, the branded drug becomes relatively cheaper for the consumers and that 
effect increases their utility. Yet, drug prices increase as we could verify in the previous section, 
and that reduces total utility. Consumers then face two contradictory effects, but if   is 
sufficiently low, the first one always dominates. When   
  
  
 , consumers get to pay a small 
share of the real drug price. Consequently, the general price increase that comes from the 
reduction of   has little effect on consumers.  
 Nevertheless, it is important to underline the effect of   and t in this expression. The level 
of horizontal differentiation of generics (t and  ) increases function value and thus amplifies the 
utility reduction or increase effect of deviating r from generic drug 1. 
 
Proposition 4: A marginal reduction in the relative weight of the cheapest generic on r, 
when    , has ambiguous effects on consumer’s utility, it depends on  . For   
  
  
 
consumer’s utility increases, for   
  
  
  utility might decrease. 
 
4.2. Total Profits 
For total profits the effects are quite intuitive. The expression of the aggregate is rather simpler 
and intuitive than total utility, consisting on the sum of all profits from market firms, in 
equilibrium. As a nomenclature simplifying procedure we will call it J; 
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 .               (50) 
Taking first order derivative of the function, and assuming the same conditions    ; 
                                
  
  
 
   
    
                  
   
   .                               (51) 
Now the result is substantially clearer. A small reduction of  , once again, in other words, a 
small increase in the influence of the expensive generic, increases profits of the firms in the 
market, as an aggregate. Recalling the result of the static analysis on individual profits, we know 
that generic firm 1 may increase or decrease profits depending on the level of horizontal 
differentiation, and the other two supply players reduce their profits on the increase of  . What 
this result adds to this analysis is that the increase from firm one is more than compensated by 
the decrease of the other two firms. 
 
Proposition 5: A marginal reduction in the relative weight of the cheapest generic on r, 
when    , increases total profits of the industry. 
 
4.3. Third-payer’s expenditure. 
Extending the study to the third-payer’s expenditures, which is the amount between the price 
received by the producer and the out of pocket expenditure of the consumer. Translating the 
concept to analytical language; 
                                                 .                           (52) 
Once again, taking first order derivative and evaluating in    ; 
                        
  
  
 
   
   
                            
   
   .                          (53) 
A small decrease in  , when the reference price is set by the cheapest generic, 
generates an increase in third payer share. This result is particularly important in what concerns 
public policy. At the same time, the rationale behind this effect is particularly easy to understand, 
given that, as was explained above, the increase of the influence of the expensive generic in r, not 
only increases all prices, but also decreases generic demand. The generic price increase has a 
particularly important effect here, once the third-payer’s expenditure is only affected by the 
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reference price. The fact is that for a decreasing   the reference is deviating from the cheapest 
drug price, which by the way is also increasing its price. Concluding, we have three effects in the 
same direction, prices increase, demand shifts to expensive drugs and r is increasing. This way, 
the third payer ends spending more for each unit of the drug sold. To conclude this point, we will 
just add that this is one of most consensual topics of the literature on the theme, and it is no 
surprise that almost all reference systems define as reference the cheapest price, or the mean of 
the cheapest prices in each cluster.  
 
Proposition 6: A marginal reduction in the relative weight of the cheapest generic on r, 
when    , increases third payer expenditure. 
 
4.4. Social welfare. 
Social welfare is the sum of previous aggregates studied, total utility and total profits, minus third 
payer share. The idea now is to understand whether the society, as a whole, is better off with the 
definition of the cheapest generic within the cluster as reference. At this point, it is important to 
say that this variable does not measure the transfers between different agents within the society. 
In a certain way, and from this perspective, total welfare has no concerns on distribution justice 
or egalitarian wellbeing of the different agents. So, the previous analysis is not only necessary but 
also richer in what comes to political favoring one over another agent through political choice. 
Retaining all those issues, total welfare can be analytically described as the sum of previous 
variables; 
                                                                                                        (54) 
Using the same methodology and taking the first order derivative and evaluating at point 
    , 
                          
  
  
 
   
      
                           
       
   .                    (55) 
Social welfare tends to increase when we deviate the reference from the cheapest 
generic in the market. The outcome achieved might be explained by the increased profits and the 
ambiguous effects on consumer’s utility that such shift generates, since it increases third payer 
share as it was proved before. Gathering all information, we know now that a bigger influence of 
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the cheapest generic in reference scheme tends to decrease prices, increase cheap generic’s 
market share, decrease total profits, third payer share, social welfare and has ambiguous effects 
on consumer’s utility.  
 
Proposition 7: A marginal reduction of the relative weight of the cheapest generic on r, 
when    , increases social welfare. 
 
Such result might be somehow surprising, since the model is telling us that a stricter 
reference system reduces total welfare. The fact is that the model described, with fixed total 
demand, implies that profits, third-payer’s expenditures and consumer expenses eliminate each 
other. This means that we end up with a consumer surplus minus transportation costs. Those 
costs increase when consumers switch from the brand firm to both generic firms, given that the 
branded firm’s consumers do not face them. Without favoring one agent against the others, what 
we have is a matter of income transfers. 
Returning to the beginning of this chapter, we know that transportation costs are, from 
the consumer perspective, the perceived difference between the brand and any other generic 
drug. The importance of those costs drives us to a much more philosophical question - the 
meaning of such costs. Given that the bioequivalence of generic drugs has to be proved in order 
to allow any generic firm to enter the market, transportation costs might be seen as the 
confidence of consumers in the brand. If that is true, should policy makers concern about those 
costs? The history of policy decisions on the subject tells us that such costs are not the first 
concern of political makers. That can be alleged because the increase of generic drugs’ market 
share is a target of many countries’ pharmaceutical market policy. Here, we are focusing on 
another relevant issue, about what is the political target, or in other words, what is the policy 
maker’s utility function.  
In countries like Portugal, where pharmaceutical industry represents a small share of the 
gross domestic product, policy makers might be tempted to ignore profits, maximizing total utility 
and minimizing third payer share. The previous case is especially true for countries with a public 
health insurance system which is the case of many European countries. Economic intuition tells 
us that removing profits from political equation increases the incentives of regulatory policy to 
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trigger higher competition and lower prices. Using the model to try to answer those questions, we 
might create a new aggregate, say L, as a function of total Utility and third-payer’s expenditures: 
                                                   .                                                           (56) 
 Using the same methodology:       
                              
  
  
 
   
  
                  
    
  .                                       (57) 
 As we might see in (55), the effect of a slight increase of the influence of the expensive 
generic and therefore a reduction in   decreases the aggregate L. Unlike total welfare, L is 
maximized for    . Consequently, we now conclude that policy decision maker, or the society, 
in countries without their own pharmaceutical industry like Portugal, is better off setting reference 
pricing to the cheapest generic in the market. This outcome does not depend on the values 
assumed for   and l. This conclusion is somehow the one we were expecting, and what the 
economic literature analyzed indicates. Returning to literature review, we might now conclude 
that the schemes designed to induce generic entry, ether are more appealing to firms, come at a 
greater cost for consumers and third payer. However, questions explored around R&D, and 
innovative and generic drugs’ market entry, which are not addressed in the model, should 
represent a major concern when defining regulatory policy. 
 
Proposition 8: A marginal reduction in the relative weight of the cheapest generic on r, 
when    , reduces the welfare of consumers and third payer as a whole. 
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5. Conclusion 
Reference pricing has been one of the most popular policy measures in the western 
pharmaceutical markets. In this thesis, we look at the policy from a theoretical perspective. 
However, most of the conclusions derived from the developed model are in line with what 
empirical literature has been founding on the policy during the last few decades. We show how 
the variables that the policy maker has at his disposal influence the behavior of firms in the 
market. Concretely, we have shown how the rate of coinsurance and the influence of the different 
generics in the reference price manage to lower all prices.  
The role of the cheapest generic in the market seems to be particularly important. The 
way the system manages to highlight its influence inside the reference is decisive to increase 
price competition between drugs. Our model is able to capture that importance through the slight 
advantage of the expensive generic drug, thus breaking the assumption of collusive behavior 
between generics.  We conclude that a higher influence of the cheapest generic increases price 
elasticity of demand inducing higher generic market shares and lower prices.  
Concerning the welfare analysis, the model conclusions meet our expectations since the 
influence of the cheapest generic seems to induce lower profits and lower third-payer’s 
expenditure. That fact is particularly important in a conjuncture of severe restrictions on 
governments’ expenditure which several policy adopting countries face. The influence of the 
cheapest generic on consumer’s utility seems to be, however, ambiguous. That fact is directly 
connected to the consumers’ perceived lower quality of generics. Sensitization campaigns in 
order to reduce that perceived difference might enhance generic consumption but also reduce 
brand prices.  
We must assume, nevertheless, some limitations on the approach used. The model 
captures a market of an off-patent drug and the conclusions are limited to a generic reference 
pricing system. The therapeutic version of the scheme is likely to induce higher price competition 
even for the under patent drug in the cluster, as literature suggests. Yet, such version of the 
policy is out of the model scope. Another limitation to the model arises from the simplifications 
assumed. In fact, we assume no fixed or variable costs which limits the market sustainability 
analysis. Although it is not an over simplifying assumption, it would be interesting to understand 
how fixed or variable costs could influence firms market behaviors. Fixed costs could be 
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particularly important when it comes to generic entry. In our model we assured the presence of 
the three players in equilibrium, nonetheless, in a real market, the decision maker must define a 
sustainable market not only for firms within it, but also attractive to new generics that may 
increase competition. 
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Annex 
Empirical approaches: 
Study Time Period Geographic Area Effect on Prices Effect on Market Shares 
Moreno-Torres, Puig- Junoy, 
Raya (2010) 
1995-2006 Spain 
Price decreases 
 (Only when pharmacists are obliged to dispense 
the generic cheaper version when the price of the 
prescribed drug is above RP) 
- 
Puig-Junoy, Moreno-Torres 
(2010) 
1997-2009 Spain 
Price decreases 
 (only when reference is revised) 
- 
Dalen, Strom, Haabeth 
(2006) 
Note: Price cap regulation policy 
1998-2004 Norway 
Price decreases 
 
Generic share increases 
Reduced market power 
Danzon, Ketcham 
(2003) 
1998 
Germany, Netherlands, New 
Zealand 
Lower prices under broader clusters. 
Higher competition results in fewer 
entries of innovative drugs.  
Bigger countries suffer less from 
avoided entry of new drugs 
Ghishlandi, Krulitchova, 
Garattini. (2005) 
2001-2003 Italy Price decreases Generic share increases 
Andersson et al. 
(2006) 
 
1986 Sweden 
Price decreases 
 (Reduction in the slope of cost/DDD trend of 
increase for a short term) 
- 
Jaume Puig-Junoy 
(2007) 
2001-2004 Spain 
Price decreases 
 (For off-patent drugs) 
Overall impact on market sales was 
“Relatively modest”. 
Nina Pavcnik 
(2002) 
1986-1996 Germany 
Price decreases 
 (Overall price reduction. More expressive for 
brands, with average price reduction of 21 to 
26%) 
- 
Brekke, Holmas, Straume(2011) 2001-2004 Norway 
Price decreases 
 (Overall reduction. More expressive in the 
case of brand (33%) than generics (22%) 
Generic share increases 
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Theoretical Approaches: 
Study Comparison Price 
Market 
Coverage 
Consumer 
surplus 
Profit Expenditure 
Brekke, Holmas, 
Straume(2011) 
No regulation versus Price 
cap. 
        
     
    
- - - 
Price cap versus 
Endogenous RP. 
        
     
    
- - - 
Increased influence of 
generic in endogenous RP 
function. 
        
     
    
- - - 
Reduction of RP in 
exogenous system. 
        - - - - 
Marisa Miraldo 
(2009) 
Introduction of a average 
or minimum RP policy. 
(2 firms without vertical 
differentiation) 
Lower under Minimum 
RP 
Higher for 
average RP 
Higher for 
average RP 
Higher for 
average RP 
Higher in minimum RP 
(inverse before policy introduction) 
Introduction of a average 
RP policy. 
(Market with 2 vertically 
and horizontally 
differentiated firms) 
Increased 
Unclear 
(depends on 
quality, co-
payment and 
influence on RP 
function) 
Unclear 
(depends on 
quality, co-
payment and 
influence on 
RP function) 
Unclear 
(depends on 
quality, co-
payment and 
influence on RP 
function) 
- 
Jorge Mestre-
Ferrándiz (2003) 
                
                    
Transition from 
reimbursement to Spanish 
reference pricing. 
(reference defined within 
an interval between Brand 
cost to    ) 
3)     
                      
                   = 
2)                   
 
           
            
           
 
- 
            
              
            
 
              
                  
              
 
S. Ghislandi (2011) Theoretical approach on Prices are always lower    r is set to minimum 
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generic competition in a 
RP system with r set 
endogenously. 
on brand independence 
of r. 
Generics tend to collude 
around r 
when there’s BI and 
perfect elasticity. 
Leaving less 
expenditure to third 
payer and more out of 
pocket expenditure 
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European RPS: 
 
Reference Schemes 
Scheme Country 
Average Price of all medicines Croatia, Hungary 
Average price of generics France 
Lowest price of all medicines Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, 
Hungary, Italy Latvia, Poland, Spain, 
Turkey 
Lowest priced generic medicines Bulgaria, Denmark, France , Lavia 
Average of the five lowest priced generic 
medicines. 
Portugal 
Weighted average of all products in one 
group and calculated by regression 
analysis 
Germany 
Weighted average price of all medicines The Netherlands 
 
Clustering methods 
Method Country 
By active substance Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia,Czech 
republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland, 
Portugal Spain, Turkey. 
By Pharmacological Class Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Germany, Hungary, The Netherlands. 
By Therapeutic class Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, 
Hungary, Latvia, Poland. 
Source: European Generic Medicines Association, cit by Dylst et al. 2012. 
 
Reference pricing systems in Europe 
With RP Without RP 
Belgium, 
Bulgaria, 
Croatia, 
Germany, 
Hungary, 
Italy, 
Latvia, 
Turkey 
Czech Republic, 
Denmark, 
France, 
The Netherlands 
Poland, 
Portugal, 
Spain, 
 
Austria,  
Norway,  
Sweden,  
UK. 
